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US Secretary Mike Pompeo and Iraqi Speaker Muhammad Halbusi,
January 2019. Source: US State Department/Flickr.
In August 2019, Iraqi Federal Police showed up at the mayor’s o ce in
Fallujah to expel ‘Aissa al-Sayir, the mayor, who had long been a key player
in the city’s politics. Citing voting irregularities, the Anbar Governorate
deployed the police after Sayir refused to give up his post. The event
attracted little notice in the international press, but within Iraq many
observers believed that the ultimate mover in this drama was not the local
government at all, but Muhammad al-Halbusi, the Speaker of the Iraqi
parliament, and one of the wealthiest businessmen in Anbar. The removal
of Fallujah’s mayor represented a changing of the guard in Sunni politics,
as a new elite seeks to assert itself in the post-ISIS era.
The discussion of ISIS in Iraq often focuses on Sunni-Shia divides, but this
tends to ignore the crucial role of intra-Sunni dynamics in preserving the
peace. In post-ISIS Iraq, the Sunni elite have split, with one segment allying
itself to Baghdad and reaping enormous bene ts—for itself and for cities
like Fallujah—while the other segment has found itself excluded from
patronage. Those, like Halbusi, who prove willing to bridge confessional
divides are the winners in this new Iraq, while the old Sunni elite who cling
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to pre-war alignments are the losers. Understanding this divide is crucial
to ensuring a lasting political settlement.
The New Elite: The Rise of Muhammad al-
Halbusi
Muhammad al-Halbusi is one of the most powerful Sunnis in the country,
but he derives this status not from a grassroots base but rather by virtue
of his alliance with the Fatah parliamentary bloc, which is led by  gures
linked to the powerful Iran-backed Badr Brigade. Hailing from the town of
Garma in Fallujah’s northeastern outskirts, al-Halbusi belongs to the
Halbus clan. Pre-2003, the Halbus was far less in uential than Fallujah’s
other tribes, and exerted little in uence on the Ba’athist state. The clan
also had few ties to the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, which in the late
Saddam years was an important actor in Fallujah. After 2003,
marginalised clans like the Halbus did not make up an important part of
the mainstream anti-U.S. resistance; instead, it was jihadi groups like al-
Qa’eda in Iraq that recruited heavily from the ranks of the Halbus and
similar lower-status clans.
In this environment, Muhammad al-Halbusi, who had a degree in
engineering, distinguished himself from the majority of his compatriots by
working openly with the Americans as early as 2003 on renovation and
reconstruction projects. In June 2004, al-Halbusi’s  rm, Steel Company
Ltd., was one of many Iraqi companies sub-contracted to work on a $28.6
million water treatment facility in Fallujah. The project soon stalled due to
the deteriorating security situation and contractor negligence; by 2005,
FluorAMEC, the American  rm leading the project, estimated that it would
cost $51.3 million to complete the project. By 2011, this had risen to
$107.8 million. By this point, Muhammad al-Halbusi had become a major
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player in Fallujah. Three years later, he was elected to represent the city in
parliament.
The Old Elite: The Decline of ‘Aissa al-Sayir
The political trajectory of Aissa al-Sayir, the ousted Fallujah mayor, was
the mirror opposite of Halbusi’s. Understanding his rise and fall requires
exploring the complex relationship between the Baʿth regime and Islamist
movements before 2003. During the 1970s and 1980s, Saddam Hussein’s
government carried out extensive repression of the Iraqi Muslim
Brotherhood, sentencing many to death. However, by the 1990s the Iraqi
president’s stance towards the group began to shift, especially as the
regime looked to promote an alternative Islamist vision that could
compete with, and be more easily managed than, Saudi-linked Sala sm. In
1991, dozens of Brotherhood leaders saw their sentences commuted, and
were eventually released. In Fallujah and elsewhere in Anbar, Brotherhood
 gures such as Abd al-Razaq al-Sa’adi and Makki Hussein al-Kubaysi, who
had been operating covertly, began to proselytise in the open, often in
conjunction with the Baʿth party’s Faith Campaign. (Al-Kubaysi was an
associate of Baʿthist Faith Campaigner Subhei Samara’i, promoting pro-
Ba’athist variant of Brotherhood thinking; ‘Abd al-Razaq al-Sa’adi
meanwhile, brother of Brotherhood leader ‘Abd al-Malik al-Sa’adi, was
close with ‘Abd al-Latif al-Humaym, another pro-Ba’athist cleric who was
among the richest families in Anbar.) Many of these  gures became key
leaders in the post-2003 insurgency; Makki al-Kubaysi, for example,
became one of the founders of the Association of Muslim Scholars, a
body that funneled funds to Brotherhood-linked insurgent groups such as
the 1920 Revolutionaries Brigades and the Islamic Army of Iraq.
One of the leaders who emerged from this milieu was ‘Aissa al-Sayir.
Having graduated with the rank of Lieutenant from Iraq’s Police Academy
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in 1993, al-Sayir had solid Baʿthist credentials. At the same time, his tribe,
the Albu ‘Aissa, had contributed more members to the ranks of Fallujah’s
Muslim Brotherhood than any other tribe. After 2003, ‘Aissa himself
became a high-ranking member of the Brotherhood’s political front, the
Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Many prominent IIP-a liated  gures who
dominated Sunni politics after 2003, such as Rafa al-‘Aissawi and Khamis
Khanjar, were similarly Albu ‘Aissa tribesmen from Fallujah. Following the
US invasion, IIP chapters throughout Anbar seized control of city councils,
police departments, and the Anbar provincial council, liaising with the
Americans while simultaneously funding the 1920’s Revolutionary
Brigades, the Islamic Army of Iraq, and other insurgent groups.
In 2007, the IIP in Fallujah formed a new armed faction, Hamas Iraq, which
joined the US-backed Sahwa—“Awakening”—movement against al-Qa’eda.
Al-Sayir, who was o cially serving as an “aide” to the police chief,
moonlighted as the commander of Hamas Iraq. Hamas Iraq is widely
believed to have exploited the cover provided by the Sahwa to lead a
campaign of arrests and executions against the IIP’s political enemies.
For a brief period in 2011 and 2012, al-Sayir spent time in jail following a
government crackdown on the IIP and other Sunni politicians such as Ra 
al-‘Aissawi and former Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi.
However, following the re-emergence of al-Qa’eda in Iraq as ISIS in 2013, a
rapprochement occurred between the IIP and the Iraqi government, which
sought an Islamist ally to thwart the appeal of ISIS among Sunnis. In
provincial elections that April, the IIP catapulted back to power throughout
Anbar, regaining in uence over the governorship, provincial council, and
numerous other bodies. In 2015, al-Sayir was appointed mayor of Fallujah.
The Birth of a New Era
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Though the rise of ISIS proved useful for the IIP, it paid far greater
dividends for the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), a massive umbrella
body comprised of mostly Shi’a militias that operated in partnership with—
but not under the purview of—regular Iraqi army forces. Even the PMF’s
critics acknowledged its indispensable role in defeating ISIS, a legacy that
granted the group political capital during the May 2018 parliamentary
elections. The factions closest to Iran united as the Fatah Alliance.
Muhammad al-Halbusi was by now a rival of the IIP, who sought to
monopolise resource distribution and exclude those outside their
patronage network, especially with an independent power base like al-
Halbusi. So he took the unusual step of throwing his lot in with Fatah, a
pro-Iran party. The gamble paid off, as Halbusi was elected Iraq’s Speaker
of Parliament, despite the fact that his party, Al-Hal Alliance, had won few
votes.
“We supported Muhammad al-Halbusi to become speaker of Iraq’s
parliament,” said Hadi al-Ameri, Chairman of the Fatah Alliance and the
Badr Brigades. “He’s a man of his word.” Throughout 2020, Fatah MPs
have publicly defended al-Halbusi from attempts by IIP-a liated o cials
to submit a vote of no-con dence and have him impeached. Al-Halbusi’s
Al-Hal Alliance used such support to supplant the IIP as the new power
broker in Anbar province. It has also bene ted from independent revenue
streams, such as that of Jamal al-Karbuli, a wealthy Sunni businessman
from Masyab, a mixed-sect city in southern Iraq where the Badr Brigades
maintain a strong presence. Both the Governor of Anbar that ordered
Aissa al-Sayir’s removal, Ali Farhan al-Dulayimi, and al-Sayir’s replacement,
Muwayyed Farhan al-Dulaymi, are members of the Al-Hal Alliance and owe
their status to deals made by al-Halbusi in parliament.
Since al-Halbusi’s appointment, Fallujah has witnessed a massive
reconstruction boom. Hundreds of new residential units have popped up.
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O cials are paving the city’s main thoroughfares, rebuilding the important
al-Muwaza n bridge, and are working on the city’s water treatment facility.
(This latter project is being paid for with a $285 million loan from the
Japanese International Cooperation Agency in 2015.)
The rivalry between al-Halbusi and the IIP in Fallujah, rooted in old socio-
economic cleavages, is now oriented around seeking to bene t from such
lucrative contracts. Shortly before his dismissal, Aissa al-Sayir was
rumored to have met with Khamis Khanjar, a fellow Albu ‘Aissa tribesman
with historical links to the IIP and who, like al-Halbusi, has used his riches
to in uence national politics, making the two bitter enemies. Khanjar’s
own party, “the Arab Project,” includes in its ranks IIP  gures such as Rafa
al-Aissawi and Tariq al-Hashimi, targets of the government’s crackdown
on Sunni politicians in 2011-2012. Prior to his removal, opponents
accused al-Sayir of stalling reconstruction projects in Fallujah in order to
ensure that the city’s IIP elite won the contracts. However, since al-Sayir’s
departure, al-Halbusi has become something of a “city boss” in Fallujah,
with companies linked to him and his Al-Hal Alliance monopolising funds
pouring into the city.
Social media gives a sense of the reach of al-Halbusi’s patronage network.
Fallujah’s mayor, for example, recently tweeted using the hashtag
#Fallujah_in_the_eyes_of_Halbusi’s_men a video of two supporters
standing on the city’s renovated main thoroughfare, praising their
benefactor:
“We want to say thank you, Anbar’s number one hero of reconstruction, the
architectural engineer, Muhammad al-Halbusi! And who else? Fallujah’s
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mayor, Sir Muwayyed Farhan al-Dualimi. Your positive touch [on the city] is
clear!”.
@moaedfarhan77
Rebuilding Fallujah has brought tremendous bene ts for the city. That
such efforts are linked to a political force rooted in a cross-sect alliance is
a cause for optimism. Al-Halbusi himself has promoted his alliance with
Fatah using just such a narrative, declaring that following after the horrors
of ISIS, Iraqis are ready to move past confessional divides.
Yet in allying with the Badr Brigades and in marginalising the old Sunni
elite, Halbusi and the new elite risk stoking resentment in Anbar—
potentially creating fault lines that ISIS-like groups can exploit in the
future. The mass graves dotting the surroundings of Fallujah, left behind
by Iran-backed militias, remain unaccounted for. (Recently, for example, al-
Halbusi refused to point  ngers at the militias when a few dozen bodies
turned up in al-Babil governorate, where many Sunnis had been abducted
and killed). Tens of thousands who have lost their family members due to
these militias remain without justice, or a truth and reconciliation process.
Through such partnerships, Halbusi has added to the sense in Fallujah
that these militias are able to operate with impunity. Meanwhile, the IIP
continues to exert an in uence. Its members proliferate the ranks of
Anbar’s Sunni middle class, and occupy many bureaucratic posts in local
government and in key industries. The best hope for a stable Iraq is a
lasting political settlement, which will depend on the country’s resources—
in terms of reconstruction funds and access to justice—being shared
equitably across its society.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of the
Con ict Research Programme, the London School of Economics and
Political Science, nor the UK Government.
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